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Abstract
Recent research has shown that the benefits associated with incubation periods during individual
problem solving can be explained in terms of forgetting the material or of any strategy that serves
to block progress toward success (e.g., Smith & Blankenship, 1991). While interacting groups reliably
outperform individuals on both problem-solving and recall tasks, groups’ superior memory capacity
may serve to hinder problem solving, especially when fixation has occurred. In the present study,
individuals and three-person groups attempted to solve a set of 20 rebus puzzles on two different
occasions. In the first session rebuses were accompanied by “clues,” that were designed to either
help or hinder problem solving. Following a 15-minute filled incubation period, the rebuses were
again presented without the clues. As expected, groups recalled more of the clues than did individual
problem solvers. Additionally, individual problem-solvers’ performance was improved following the
incubation period on the misleading clue items but not the good clue items. Following incubation,
groups improved on both the helpful and misleading clue items. The possibility that incubation effects
may vary with task type in group problem-solving contexts is discussed.
Keywords
fixation in groups, group problem solving, incubation effects
Paper received 4 October 2008; revised version accepted 20 May 2009.
A relatively large and reliable “group superiority
effect” can be found in the research tradition
comparing individual to group information
processing (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997;
Shaw, 1932; Vollrath, Sheppard, Hinsz, & Davis,
1989). Of particular relevance to the present paper
is the robust finding that collaborative recall is
superior to individual recall (Clark & Stephenson,
1989; Hinsz, 1991; Hoppe, 1962; Lorge &
Solomon, 1962; Tindale & Sheffey, 2002; Weldon

& Bellinger, 2000) for a wide variety of stimuli
(e.g., nonsense syllables, words, stories, events).
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Groups are assumed to outperform individuals
on tasks involving recall because of their larger
storage capacity, their ability to distribute and
organize information in transactive memory
systems (Wegner, 1987), and because of the crosscuing that occurs in collaborative recall (Meudell,
Hitch, & Boyle, 1995; Stasson & Bradshaw, 1995).
Cross-cuing occurs when the memories recalled
by one group member prompt fellow group
members to recall information that they would
otherwise have failed to retrieve. The increased
capacity to encode, store, and retrieve information possessed by groups is assumed to be associated with enhanced problem solving, which, in
part, accounts for the extremely robust finding
that groups outperform individuals on problemsolving tasks (Davis, 1969; Hinsz et al., 1997).
While it is intuitively appealing to assume
that enhanced memory processes necessarily lead
to better problem solving, the act of forgetting
may also produce better problem-solving performance under certain conditions, especially
in contexts where fixation has occurred (Smith,
& Blankenship, 1989, 1991; Smith & Vela, 1991).
Analogous to a “mental rut,” fixation occurs
when an individual fails to abandon faulty information or ineffective strategies in her/his attempt
to solve a problem, thereby preventing insightful
discovery (Duncker, 1945; Luchins, 1942). One
well-explored remedy for fixation involves
spending time away from the problem, or incubation (Olton, 1979). While explanations for the
incubation process are varied, the forgetting-fixation hypothesis is of particular importance in this
study (Smith & Blankenship, 1989).
According to the forgetting-fixation hypothesis,
the faulty information or strategy applied during
the fixation state blocks the ability to retrieve
alternative strategies or more appropriate information from memory. Incubation periods allow
for the forgetting of inappropriate information,
thereby making appropriate information more
accessible in memory (Smith, 1995). Smith and
his colleagues, using a wide variety of research
paradigms and experimental tasks, have generated
ample evidence in support of the forgettingfixation hypothesis (Smith & Blankenship, 1991;

Smith & Tindell, 1997; Smith & Vela, 1991). In one
study, individuals were asked to solve several
rebus puzzles under conditions of experimentally
induced fixation (Smith & Blankenship, 1989).
Rebuses are word/picture puzzles that typically represent common sayings or phrases. For
example, “wheather” represents the expression
“an ill spell of weather” and “you just me” represents the expression “just between you and me.”
Smith and Blankenship (1989) created states of
fixation by presenting misleading “clues” that
were demonstrated to hinder problem solving
along with several of the rebus problems (e.g., the
words “or not” with the ill spell of weather puzzle or “beside” with the puzzle just between you
and me). Consistent with the forgetting-fixation
hypothesis, the blocking effect created by the
misleading clues diminished over time and higher
rates of problem solving were associated with
longer incubation periods. That is, with the passage of time the misleading clue that was designed
to block the generation of the puzzle’s correct
solution became less accessible to the problem
solver (i.e., it was forgotten), thereby making it
more likely that the individual would access more
appropriate information.
In the present study we examined the forgetting-fixation hypothesis within the context of
freely interacting three-person groups. More specifically, we explored the possibility that a group’s
superior memory capacity could serve to hinder
its problem-solving ability under conditions of
experimentally induced fixation. When problemsolving success is dependent upon the forgetting
of that which blocks access to relevant information, groups may be at a distinct disadvantage, at
least relative to individuals, because the likelihood
that groups will abandon an ineffective strategy
through the process of forgetting is much lower
than it is for individuals. Stated somewhat differently, in contexts where fixation has occurred, the
benefits that are typically associated with incubation periods for the individual problem solver
may be less pronounced in a group problem-solving context.
We employed a slightly modified version of
the Smith and Blankenship (1989) paradigm in
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that a set of rebus puzzles, half associated with
helpful clues and half associated with misleading
clues were presented to individuals and threeperson groups at two points in time. At the
pretest, each rebus puzzle was presented
along with a clue. Following the 15-minute incubation period, each rebus puzzle was presented
again, this time without its corresponding clue.
Consistent with several well-established principles of group information processing as well as
the forgetting-fixation hypothesis, it was hypothesized that groups would recall more of the associated clues following an incubation period than
would individuals. Consequently, in light of their
enhanced ability to recall the associated clues,
groups were predicted to perform best on the
rebus puzzles paired with helpful clues (i.e.,
remembering useful information would facilitate solving the puzzle) and less well on the
rebus puzzles paired with misleading clues (i.e.,
remembering misleading information would
block access to the problem’s solution). A pattern
opposite that predicted for group problem solvers
was expected for the individuals. That is, individuals were expected to perform best on the items
associated with misleading clues (i.e., forgetting
the misleading clue would allow more appropriate information to be accessible).
While opposite patterns across the two puzzle
types are expected for individuals and groups, it was
considered likely that groups would still outperform
individual problem solvers. In other words, while
groups might not be able to reap the benefits associated with incubation to the same degree that individuals were expected to, this difference was not
expected to attenuate or completely cancel out the
known benefits associated with problem-solving in
groups. This prediction is consistent with the “truthwins” group decision process that has been demonstrated in past research comparing individual to
group performance on problems with highly
demonstrable solutions (Laughlin & Ellis, 1986;
Laughlin, Kerr, Munch, & Haggarty, 1976), as well
as Lorge and Solomon’s (1955) “Model A,” an early
mathematical model of group performance. Each
states that the probability of a group solving a particular problem correctly is equal to the probability

that the group contains at least one member who is
capable of solving the problem correctly. That is,
once a single individual within the group generates
the correct response, as long as she/he can demonstrate the veracity of the position to others, she/he
has little difficulty convincing the group to adopt
that response as their own. When groups work on
easily demonstrated intellective tasks (i.e., tasks with
correct responses) they outperform the average
individual, but not necessarily the “best” individuals
(but see Laughlin, Hatch, Silver, & Boh, 2006).

Method
Participants and design
One hundred and twenty-six introductory psychology students at a large Midwestern University
were randomly assigned to participate as either
individuals (N = 24) or as members of three-person
groups (N = 102, 34 groups). All participants
received course credit for their involvement in the
experiment. A 2 (problem-solving entity: Group/
Individual) × 2 (clue type: Helpful/Misleading)
× 2 (time of performance: Pretest/Posttest)
mixed design was used. Both clue type and time
of performance were within-subjects variables.

Experimental stimuli
A set of 20 (4 extremely easy, 16 difficult) rebus
puzzles were developed for use in the study. A
“clue” was developed for each rebus puzzle and
12 clues were designed to increase the likelihood
that the rebus puzzle was solved. Eight “clues”
were designed to hinder solving the rebuses with
which they were associated. Extensive pilot testing of the rebuses and the clues verified their
overall level of difficulty as well as the effects of
each clue.1 The four easy rebus puzzles were associated with extremely helpful clues and these
puzzles were presented first in an attempt to
enhance the perception that the clues would
indeed facilitate solving the puzzles. These easy
rebus problems were solved by all participants in
the study and were not included in any of the
analyses presented below (i.e., the analyzed problem set included 16 difficult rebus problems,

Downloaded from gpi.sagepub.com at GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIV LIB on May 28, 2013

94		

Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 13(1)

eight with helpful clues and eight with clues
designed to hinder performance).

Procedure
The entire experiment was presented to participants via the stimulus presentation software
SuperLab 4.0. Individuals and three-person
groups were seated in front of a large computer screen and given a sheet with 20 numbered
lines on which to record their answers (in the
group condition the sheet was given to a single
randomly chosen individual). The first screen
of the program, shown at the start of the
experiment, contained detailed instructions
regarding how the participants were to move
through the experiment. In addition, they were
also shown two sample rebus problems along
with an explanation regarding how they were to
be solved. Participants were not aware that they
would be tested on the rebus problems a second
time nor that their memory for the clues
would be assessed. Participants in the group
condition were asked to work collaboratively
on the puzzles.
Before each puzzle, a clue was presented for
three seconds followed immediately by the rebus
which was shown for 30 seconds.2 The participants were not allowed to return to a rebus puzzle once it had disappeared from the screen.
After the last rebus problem was presented, all
participants were given a filler task which consisted
of ten difficult mathematical “brain-teaser”
puzzles, each presented for 90 seconds. These
problems created the 15-minute filled incubation period. Following the incubation period, all
participants were once again shown the 20 rebus
problems for 30 seconds each, but on this trial
the puzzles were presented without their respective “clues.” Additionally, the order in which the
rebuses were presented differed from the pretest.
Finally, participants were shown the 20 rebuses
(in yet another random order) and were asked to
recall and record the clue that was associated
with each rebus puzzle.

Results
Clue memory was analyzed with a 2 (problemsolving entity: Group/Individual) × 2 (clue type:
Helpful/Misleading) ANOVA. As expected,
groups recalled more clues (M = 6.69, SD = .13)
than did individuals (M = 3.98, SD = .19), F (1, 56) =
121.36, p = .01, η2 = .64. Helpful clues were recalled
more frequently (M = 5.92, SD = .155) than misleading clues (M = 4.74, SD = .150), F(1, 56) =
43.04, p = .01, η2 = .43. However, clue type did not
interact with problem-solving entity, F(1, 56) =
.611, p = .44. That is, group recall (M = 7.35,
SD = 1.09) exceeded individual recall (M = 4.50,
SD = .23) for helpful clues as well as misleading
clues (M = 6.03, SD = .93 and 3.46, SD = .23,
respectively).
Solutions to the 16 difficult/critical rebus
problems were analyzed with a 2 (problemsolving entity: Group/individual) × 2 (clue type:
Helpful/misleading) × 2 (time of performance:
Pretest/Posttest) mixed ANOVA. The means
and standard deviations for each condition are
presented in the top half of Table 1. With
respect to main effects, as predicted, groups
outperformed individual problem solvers,
F(1, 56) = 36.78, p = .01, η2 = .40. Performance
improved from pretest to posttest, F(1, 56) =
95.43, p = .01, η2 = .63, and rebuses that were
associated with helpful clues were solved at a
higher rate than were those that were associated
with misleading clues, F(1, 56) = 4.58, p = .04,
η2= .08. Time of performance interacted with
problem-solving entity, F(1, 56) = 7.74, p =
.01, η2 = .12. That is, group performance
improved more than did individual performance from pretest to posttest. Clue type interacted with problem-solving entity F(1, 56) =
9.18, p = .01, η2 = .14. Overall, groups performed worse on the rebuses associated with
misleading clues relative to helpful clues, whereas
individuals performed similarly on helpful and
misleading clue rebuses. The three-way (Entity ×
Clue Type × Time) interaction was not significant, F(1, 56) = .37, p = .54.
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Table 1. Mean number of rebus puzzles solved prior to (pre) and following (post) 15-minute incubation period
Rebus type
Helpful clue

Problem solving entity
   Individuals
   Groups
Nominal groups*
   Best member
   Worst member

Misleading clue

Pre

Post

Pre

Post

1.50 (1.25)
3.62 (1.75)

1.71 (1.30)
4.24 (1.60)

1.21 (1.02)
1.91 (1.02)

2.37 (1.34)
3.76 (1.67)

.75 (.70)
2.37 (1.68)

1.12 (.83)
2.25 (1.58)

1.00 (.75)
1.25 (1.38)

1.75 (1.28)
2.62 (1.50)

Note: *Best and worst member determined by number of clues recalled. Standard deviations in parentheses.

The overall performance of the individuals was
consistent with the fixation-forgetting hypothesis.
Performance was significantly improved on the
misleading clue items following incubation, t(23) =
4.74, p = .00 and unchanged on the helpful clue
items, t(23) = 1.15, p = .26. Additionally, at the
posttest, individuals performed better on the
items associated with misleading clues relative to
the items associated with helpful clues, t(23) =
2.71, p = .01. With respect to group performance,
significant improvements following incubation
were found for both misleading clue items, t(33) =
7.87, p = .00 and for helpful clue items, t(33) =
3.91, p = .00. While the difference between helpful
and misleading clue items at the posttest was in the
direction predicted, this difference did not reach
statistical significance, t(33) = 1.25, p = .21.
In order to explore further the groups’ enhanced
performance on the rebus problems we carried
out a set of analyses parallel to those described
above but this time compared interacting groups
to nominal groups created from the individuals in
our sample. Individuals were randomly assigned
to one of eight three-person nominal groups.
Within each of these groups, the best and worst
nominal group member with respect to memory
for the rebus clues was identified and her/his
solutions to the rebus puzzles were considered as
the “best” and “worst” member performances,
respectively. Creating such nominal groups allowed

us to test group performance relative to the most
and least competent members as well as to assess
better the extent to which group interaction was
beneficial to recall and problem solving (Steiner
& Rajaratnam, 1961). That is, while the above
analyses suggest that group performance was
superior in all regards, it is important to assess
whether interacting groups outperformed the
best member on rebus problems associated with
good clues as well as whether they outperformed
the worst member on problems associated with
misleading clues (where forgetting is associated
with better performance). While the results of
these analyses are interesting, we have interpreted
them with some caution given the very small
number of nominal groups we were able to
create and the resulting insensitivity of the statistical tests we applied (Keppel, 1973).
Clue memory was analyzed with 3 (problemsolving entity: Best nominal group member/Worst
nominal group member/Interacting group) ×
2 (Clue type: Helpful/Misleading) ANOVA. As
expected, interacting groups recalled more clues
(M = 6.69, SD = .13) than did best (M = 4.87, SD =
.28) and worst (M = 2.94, SD = .28) nominal
group members, F(1,47) = 80.27, p = .01, η2 = .77.
All problem-solving entities were significantly different from one another (p = .01). Helpful clues
were recalled more frequently (M = 6.44, SD =
1.80) than misleading clues (M = 5.16, SD = 1.71),
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F(1,47) = 25.06, p = .01, η2 = .35. However, clue
type did not interact with problem-solving entity,
F(1, 47) = .06, p = .93. That is, interacting groups’
recall (M = 7.35, SD = 1.9) exceeded best nominal
group members’ recall (M = 5.50, SD = .92) and
worst nominal group members’ recall (M = 3.50,
SD = 1.19) for helpful clues as well as for misleading
clues (M = 6.03, SD = .93; M = 4.24, SD = 1.03;
M = 2.38, SD = 1.30, respectively).
Solutions to the 16 difficult/critical rebus problems were analyzed with a 3 (problem-solving
entity: Best nominal group member/Worst nominal group member/Interacting group) × 2 (clue
type: Helpful/misleading) × 2 (time of performance: Pretest/Posttest) mixed ANOVA. The means
and standard deviations for each nominal group
type are presented in the bottom half of Table 1.
With respect to main effects, performance varied as
a function of problem-solving entity F(2,47) =
16.37, p = .01, η2 = .41. Interacting groups performed significantly better than the best nominal
group members (p = .01) and better than the worst
nominal group members (p = .01). The nominal
group members with the worst clue memory outperformed the nominal group members with the
best clues memory; however, this difference was
only marginally significant (p = .07). Performance
improved from pretest to posttest, F(1,47) = 38.40,
p = .01, η2 = .45. Rebuses that were associated with
helpful clues were not solved at a higher rate than
were those that were associated with misleading
clues, F(1, 47) = 1.34, p = .25. Time of performance interacted with problem-solving entity,
F(2, 47) = 4.10, p = .02, η2 = .14. That is, change
from pretest to posttest was significantly greater for
interacting groups than it was for either best or
worst nominal group members. There was a marginally significant interaction between clue type and
problem-solving entity F(2, 47) = 2.91, p = .06,
η2 = .11. Performance on the good clue items is
significantly better than performance on the misleading clue items for interacting groups (p = .01).
Clue type is not reliably associated with performance for best member or for worst member nominal
groups (p = .11 and .24, respectively). The threeway (Entity × Clue Type × Time) interaction was
not significant, F(2, 47) = .99, p = .37.

Interacting groups outperformed the best
members of nominal groups on the items associated with helpful clues, F(1, 40) = 26.06, p = .01,
η2 = .39. Likewise, interacting groups outperformed the worst members of nominal groups
on items associated with misleading clues; however
this difference was only marginally significant,
F(1, 40) = .06, η2 = .08.

Discussion
Successful problem solving is often dependent
upon the ability to abandon faulty information or
ineffective strategies in favor of more effective
alternatives. The ease with which one successfully
adopts new alternatives is determined, in part, by
the extent to which old alternatives interfere with
or block the generation of more suitable problem-solving strategies. In the present study we
explored the possibility that when faced with fixation, groups would benefit less from incubation
periods, relative to individuals, because they would
be less inclined to forget that which serves to
block alternative strategy generation. As expected,
groups did recall more of the clues associated
with the rebus problems than did the individuals.
Additionally, consistent with the work on collaborative recall, interacting groups performed
better than the best member of nominal groups
with respect to clue recall. Also consistent with predictions, groups solved more of the rebus puzzles
than did individuals. This general pattern was also
observed when individuals were combined to
create nominal groups. Clearly, group interaction
was associated with enhanced performance with
respect to both recall and problem solving.
While individuals exhibited the problemsolving patterns predicted by the fixation-forgetting
hypothesis, group performance improved following incubation on both the helpful and the misleading clue items, this, despite the fact that their
memory for the misleading clues was quite high.
Stated somewhat differently, groups appear to
have benefited from incubation in a manner quite
inconsistent with the fixation-forgetting hypothesis.
Contrary to the prediction explicated, the increment
of improvement following incubation for groups
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was greatest for rebus puzzles associated with
misleading clues. Several possible explanations
exist for the overall group problem-solving
patterns found.
It is possible that the misleading clues failed to
create a state of fixation within the groups comparable to that experienced by the individuals.
While this possibility cannot be completely ruled
out with the data we have available to us, it seems
a less likely explanation in light of the groups’
performance on the pretest rebus puzzles associated with misleading clues. Clearly, the misleading
clues appear to have interfered with the groups’
ability to generate correct solutions to the puzzles
at the pretest.
An alternative and perhaps more interesting
explanation involves the possibility that fixated
states were not experienced uniformly by group
members, that is, all group members did not
remember the associated clues following the
incubation period (a likely outcome if one generalizes from the individual clue memory data). If
groups did not begin their second attempt to
solve the rebus problem by first generating the
clue from an individual’s memory, some individual members of the group may have indeed benefited from the incubation period (i.e., forgotten
the clue that served to block the solution). This
possibility is especially important to explore in
light of the nature of the task used in this particular study. While the rebus problems were
quite difficult, they were likely extremely high in
demonstrability (i.e., a eureka-type task). That is,
once a group member discovered the solution to
the puzzle, it was unlikely that she/he experienced difficulty convincing fellow group members to adopt that answer. Therefore, it may be
that those who had forgotten the clue were also the
ones to generate the solution to the rebus puzzle.
In this particular context, then, the process that
occurred may have been analogous to the “truthwins” decision process that is reliably observed in
the group problem-solving literature (e.g., Laughlin
& Ellis, 1986). That is, groups escaped their
fixated state when at least one individual who was
capable of solving the problem also forgot the
information that blocked access to the solution.

When working on a eureka task, the presence of
one solver is predictive of the group solving the
problem. Likewise it may be that when fixated, a
group’s success is determined, at least in part, by
the presence of a member who is no longer in a
fixated state. The performance of the nominal
group members with the worst memories for the
clues is consistent with this notion; however, it is
important to note that interacting groups outperformed these nominal groups. While all of the
analyses carried out are consistent with the notion
that the group interaction process was critical to
the enhanced group performance observed in this
study, the nature of this process cannot be understood fully given the nature of the data presently
available to us. The collection of group interaction process data seems essential to developing
such an understanding.
Additionally, it seems important that future
research systematically address both group
problem-solving norms and task characteristics
as important variables in predicting the effects of
incubation in problem-solving groups. If, for
example, groups develop a norm whereby they
reliably return to where they left off right before
an incubation period and it is customary to state
this explicitly (in this context, first generating the
clue, stating the clue out loud and then proceeding to search for the solution), we would predict
that the benefits associated with incubation would
be attenuated for groups relative to individuals.
That is, returning to where one left off would
serve to ensure uniform fixation states across
group members. Likewise, it is our suspicion that
the effects associated with incubation in groups is
also likely to vary along the task demonstrability
dimension. Solutions to tasks low in demonstrability may seem less “correct” if the solution
deviates considerably from the information/
strategy that serves to create a fixated state.
For example, creative solutions to problems and
innovative ideas may be less well received by
fellow group members who are intent upon
adhering to an old plan.
While we are unable to offer an unequivocal
explanation for the group problem-solving patterns found, the current study serves as a valuable
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first step towards understanding incubation
effects in groups while also generating many
interesting questions that ought to be addressed
in future research.
Notes
1. Pilot testing was carried out with individual problem solvers and involved comparing solution rates
under clue present and clue absent conditions. All
of the helpful clue puzzles in the current research
were solved significantly more frequently under
clue present conditions and significantly less
frequently under clue present conditions when the
associated clue was misleading.
2. The exposure duration for each rebus problem was
exactly that used by Smith & Blankenship (1989).
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